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■■ BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
Discourse about pseudoscience often accompanies 
conversation about science, both in a positive and 
negative way. Despite the efforts made by some 
thinkers to separate them neatly by using effective 
criteria (Pigliucci & Boudry, 2013), the reality is 
that many people continue to 
rely on pseudoscientific healing 
practices and alternative or 
complementary therapies.
Surely, the influence of 
personal psychology on our 
perception of reality, the ease 
with which beliefs – especially 
harmful ones – become 
contagious (Blackburn, 2001, 
p. 20), the popularity of certain 
products, and the verbiage of 
many of their sellers often leave 
many people in the hands of 
practitioners with purported knowledge. In other 
words, so-called experts whose only interest is 
business and who may even prescribe unproven and 
unorthodox drugs, sometimes relying on natural 
healing that never comes, thus creating a vicious 
circle. 
Faced with this situation, the scientific method is 
the best procedure we have to eliminate subjectivities 
and external conditioning factors. However, while in 
practice this (very successful) method is not available 
to everyone, most people have developed some critical 
skills. It is precisely education in generalised critical 
thinking, and especially in scientific fields, that might 
be able to help us to restore the 
balance lost because of harmful 
practices, and to separate the 
metaphorical wheat from the 
chaff. Claude Bernard drew 
our attention to this issue more 
than a century and a half ago in 
his Introduction à l’étude de la 
médecine expérimentale:
In science the word criticism is 
not a synonym for disparagement; 
criticising means looking for truth 
by separating the true from the 
false and distinguishing the good 
from the bad. While just to men of science, such criticism 
alone is profitable for science. [...] In my opinion, then, the 
inspiration of physicians, who do not rely on experimental 
science, is mere fantasy; and in the name of science and 
humanity they should be rebuked and proscribed.
(Bernard, 1865/2005, p. 370 and p. 398)
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Therefore, although the scientific method can help 
us to prove the ineffectiveness and risk of certain 
remedies by using clinical trials that reveal latent 
contradictions or conflicting scientific evidence, we 
do not always have conclusive arguments to dispel 
our doubts, so we are always vulnerable to presumed 
experiments of questionable quality, alleged technical 
expertise or false scientific rigour. To counter this, 
reasonable criticism is required.
■■  RATIONALITY AND REASONABLENESS: FOR 
REASONABLE SCIENCE-BASED CRITICISM
Fortunately, we have some disciplines which, when 
well understood, can come to our aid. Thus, logic is 
interested in the validity of certain argumentative 
forms, and it is often said to be the canon of rationality 
and the organ of critique (Popper, 1974/2007, p. 40). 
Argumentation theory, on the other hand, is interested 
in the quality of the argumentative discourse and tends 
to equate validity with reasonableness (Alcolea, 2015). 
In fact, the terms rational and reasonable are related, 
but do not coincide in meaning. There is an important 
distinction in their use. We call the use of the faculty of 
reasoning «rational»; that is, it is the ability that makes 
us rational beings, while «reasonable» refers to using 
the faculty of reasoning correctly; it is what makes 
us reasonable people. Using it this way, rationality is 
a necessary condition for reasonableness, but it is not 
automatically a sufficient condition.
Although studies in the philosophy of science 
have observed that some irrational elements play an 
important role in the design of theories (Thomas 
Samuel Kuhn and Paul Karl Feyerabend, among 
others), many thinkers argue that scientific research 
is the paradigm of rational discussion with a specific 
objective and is the most important way of reasonably 
exchanging ideas that can be translated into critical 
discussion. Critical rationalists like Karl Popper 
have argued that any topic that can be subject to 
critical discussion lends itself to reasonable treatment, 
regardless of whether the difference of opinion has 
to do with facts, ideas, value judgments, attitudes, or 
actions. Based on this, argumentation theorists aim to 
explain how the general rule of reasonableness can be 
fulfilled in any type of critical discussion.
Nevertheless, we need science in order to be able to 
speak about pseudoscience and to clarify the reasons 
for the pseudo- prefix: if science is inclined towards 
certain pretensions of knowledge – from praetendĕre, 
“to put forward” – pseudoscience would include those 
pretensions of knowledge yet would lack evidence for 
them. Consequently, assessing a claim of knowledge as 
Pietro Longhi. The charlatan, 1757. Oil on canvas, 50 × 62 cm. 
The influence of personal psychology on the perception of reality, 
the ease with which beliefs become contagious, the popularity of 
certain products, and the verbiage of many of their sellers often 
leave us in the hands of so-called experts, whose only interest is 
business and who can even prescribe unproven, unorthodox drugs, 
sometimes relying on a natural healing that never comes, thus 
creating a vicious circle.
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such depends on the pretension of knowledge itself, 
the person who has such a claim, the attempts to 
contrast it in accordance with the scientific method, 
and the criticism to which a reasonable critic (or 
arguer) may subject it. Claims that are scientifically 
lacking or weak regarding these 
last three aspects would separate 
the claim from the scientific field 
and from a rigorous (scientific) 
arguer worthy of the name.
We know, moreover, that 
«science» is what certain people 
do when they conjecture (i.e., 
people who formulate certain 
pretensions), draw conclusions 
from those conjectures, submit 
themselves to the court of nature 
to test whether those pretensions of knowledge are 
genuine or not – whether they are confirmed or 
refuted. People who are recognised as experts, as 
scientific authorities, yet who are still fallible because 
they are scientists.
For all these reasons, we find the tragedy not so 
much in the practice of science, but in the practice 
of pseudoscience, where we find: 1) authorities that 
are, in reality, irrelevant, because their pretensions 
of knowledge are irrelevant to the subject matter; 
2) false or questionable authorities, because something 
calls their credibility into question or because they 
appeal to authorities in an improper or inadequate 
way; 3) invincible authorities, because appealing to 
them cancels or eliminates any other consideration; 
4) unidentified experts or experts who are identified in 
a vague or incomplete manner, so that their reliability 
or rigour cannot be verified; 5) compromised experts, 
with good credentials, but who raise doubts due to a 
demonstrable conflict of interest; 6) divided experts 
who do not always agree with each other.
How should we react to such a scenario? We must 
be cautious, suspend judgment, initiate alternative 
investigation, and wait for new evidence.
■■  THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY IN SCIENCE
The problem of authority in science relates to the way 
in which research results are communicated to (or 
shared with) a group of users who are not experts in 
the discipline. Of note, this process is not identified 
with, nor is it constituted by, the process we follow to 
reach conclusions. The issue becomes complicated 
when we realise that we move within two 
frameworks of communicative discourse in which 
the same argumentative sequence is used: on the 
one hand, internal scientific argumentation leads to 
a particular conclusion within the discipline; and, on 
the other, the presentation and use of that conclusion, 
and the explanation of the argumentative line that 
had led to such a conclusion in a communicative 
exchange between the authority 
and the user.
It should be noted that this 
second discursive framework 
requires arguments which, by 
themselves, are not scientific 
and which will also be used by 
non-experts who need the advice 
of an authority when involved 
in a persuasive argumentation. 
In this circumstance, and so as 
not to appear inexperienced, 
non-experts will act as follows: firstly, they ask 
the expert intelligent questions; secondly, they 
proceed reasonably when what the expert says lacks 
credibility or contradicts another expert; and, thirdly, 
they present an argumentative judgement that is 
independent of the way in which pretensions of 
knowledge are established with the scientific method. 
In contrast, in order not to appear authoritarian, 
the authority will act as thus: firstly, because they 
work with and through words, they must do so in a 
persuasive way, even if they do not need to elaborate 
on their arguments; secondly, although those who 
consult them do not have direct access to scientific 
evidence or to their qualified experience, they must 
communicate their opinions and give advice in a 
way that the user can understand; and, thirdly, while 
transmitting information or advising, they must allow 
Although the scientific method can help us to prove the 
ineffectiveness and risk of certain remedies using clinical trials 
that reveal latent contradictions or conflicting scientific evidence, 
we do not always have conclusive arguments to dispel our doubts.
«IT IS UP TO THE SCIENTIFIC 
EXPERTS TO DECIDE 
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the layperson to ask them intelligent questions about 
their own statements or pretensions of knowledge.
But both scientists and pseudoscientists consider 
themselves authorities, or can be considered as such, 
with the difference that in the first case they show 
the authority of knowledge and in the second case 
the authority consists of presumed knowledge or 
power. Scientists receive their authority from a body 
of knowledge that is: 1) independent of them as a 
subject, and of their beliefs or disposition to acquiesce 
or act (Popper, 1974/2007, p. 108); 2) methodical: all 
scientists agree on the fundamental methods used in 
their area of study; 3) conservative: it is not necessary to 
constantly reinvestigate results anchored in previously 
fixed foundations, although this does not mean that 
they cannot be revisable; 4) predictive of what we do 
not know based on our pretended knowledge and what 
may be falsifiable; 5) consistent: the pretensions of the 
knowledge of two given scientists must not conflict with 
an outstanding thesis in their area.
Then, it is useful to ask oneself, can these 
characteristics be found in the case of pseudoscience?
■■ INVITATION TO CRITICAL DISCUSSION
The first thing we must make clear is that there are 
no tribunals, no courts of justice, no eyes of God to 
decide whether a discourse, a practice, an area, and 
so on are scientific or pseudoscientific. It is up to 
scientific experts to decide what science is, presumably 
in accordance with the abovementioned characteristics 
(an internal task), and to differentiate it from non-
science, including pseudoscience. But we must go 
one step further and show a willingness to critically 
discuss the scientific value of their discourse and the 
consequences of their practices with the practitioners 
of pseudoscience (an external task). To this end, 
scientists and non-scientists must present themselves 
as reasonable and critical debaters who wish to 
engage in a process of critical discussion to resolve 
their differences of opinion. In other words: experts, 
so-called experts, and non-experts should conduct 
themselves as reasonable and critical debaters and 
embrace the idea of a critical discussion.
Then, what is a critical discussion? It is an 
argumentative exchange in a pragmatic context 
with which we try to resolve a difference of opinion 
following certain rules (Alcolea, 2011). In a critical 
discussion, those who are in favour (proponents, or the 
PR) and those who are against (opponents, or the OP) 
an opinion or pretension of knowledge try to jointly 
establish whether that opinion or pretension is defensible 
from certain doubts and critical objections. The PR 
argues for or against the opinion. The OP may respond 
critically to the PR’s argument, which may result in 
the PR continuing to try to justify or refute it using 
other arguments. Again, the OP can respond critically, 
and so on. This exchange is characteristic of a correct, 
reasonable, and critical dialectical persuasion process 
and ends when the OP accepts the justification of the PR, 
when the PR accepts the refutation of the OP, or when 
they do not reach an agreement in a clear but reasonable 
manner (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).
Therefore, in a critical discussion, a reasonable critic 
must show a willingness to resolve the difference of 
opinion via pragmatic, instrumental, and utilitarian 
rules, accept the rules, resolve differences in opinion 
in an intersubjective manner, and achieve the optimal 
result in the most effective way. This does not mean 
that the parties must automatically agree – or even 
fully agree – on everything, but rather, they must 
critically test the points of view under discussion in 
order to determine their sustainability. Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (2004, p. 189) have drawn attention 
to what we might understand as conditions for a 
critical, reasonable and adequate discussion: 1) the 
first-order objective conditions are the rules of the 
critical discussion process; 2) the second-order internal 
Critical rationalists like Karl Popper have argued that any field 
that can be subject to critical discussion lends itself to reasonable 
treatment, regardless of whether the difference of opinion has to 
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conditions are related to the mental state of the people 
involved, whose freedom may be more or less limited 
by psychological factors (emotional constraints 
or personal pressures) beyond their control; 3) the 
third-order external conditions pertain to the social 
circumstances of the discussion, special circumstances 
of the situation, and the power or authority relationship 
between the parties involved in the critical discussion.
Is it possible to achieve full critical reasonableness 
in practice? Only if the second and third-order 
conditions are met. To this end, 
the fulfilment of the second-order 
conditions can be stimulated 
through education aimed at 
reflecting on the first-order 
conditions and an understanding 
of their rational basis. Fulfilment 
of the third-order conditions 
can be encouraged by opting 
politically for individual freedom, 
non-violence, intellectual 
pluralism, and institutional 
guarantees of the right to information and criticism.
It is precisely at this point that we are in a position 
to consult the expert and ask ourselves when authority 
is legitimate and when it is legitimate to appeal 
to it (Walton, 1997). The answer is simple: when 
the individual is really an expert, when they are 
trustworthy, and when the other authorities agree with 
them. But how do we know if a person is an expert in 
a particular field? Would it not be necessary to already 
be an expert in that field? Because not everyone is an 
expert in all areas, problems multiply. However, is 
there an alternative to education? Let us remember an 
interesting note from Pigliucci (2010, p. 89): «If there 
ever was a reason to push for more education not just 
about science, but about basic critical thinking skills 
more generally, this seems to be it.»
We are aware that any 
individual – no matter how much 
of a critical thinker they may 
consider themselves and how 
willing they are to resolve their 
differences of opinion in a critical, 
reasonable, and appropriate 
manner when faced with any real 
or presumed authority – may wish 
to apply a simple test to make a 
decision on this matter. This is 
because it is well known that we 
do not react in the same way to a real authority as we 
do to a presumed authority. The kind readers can see 
for themselves when to apply the pragmatic test of 
authority: if they are in the presence of one of these 
authorities they should be able to answer the following 
questions in the affirmative:
1. Is this authority reliable? 
2.  Do they frame their pretensions of knowledge into 
a theory?
3. Can their pretensions be verified by a different 
authority?
4. Are their pretensions (internally and externally) 
consistent?
5. Have their pretensions been contested or only 
confirmed?
6. Are their conclusions supported by the available 
evidence?
7. Do they follow science-approved methods rather 
than following recipes?
8. Do they propose alternative explanations for a 
phenomenon rather than deny those offered by a 
different authority?
9. Are their explanations conservative or expansive?
10. Are their conclusions independent from their 
personal beliefs?
Passing the test means that we have found a critical 
scientific authority. However, can everyone pass the test 
of being a presumed authority? Figure 1 (Walton, Reed, 
There are no tribunals, no courts of justice, no eyes of God to 
decide whether a discourse, a practice, an area, and so on are 
scientific or pseudoscientific.
«IN A CRITICAL DISCUSSION, 
A REASONABLE CRITIC 
MUST SHOW A WILLINGNESS 
TO RESOLVE THE 
DIFFERENCE OF OPINION 
VIA PRAGMATIC RULES»
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& Macagno, 2008, pp. 309–310) can help us to take a 
step towards unmasking a fake authority.
In this diagram (Walton, 2010, p. 170), the usual 
conclusion drawn from the box on the left, which 
contains two boxes with two statements, is that P 
is true, an inference which would be heuristically 
justified if we also consider the box on the right, 
which in turn contains a condition that would link 
both statements to the conclusion. This inferential 
procedure tends to hide what we consider to be 
«reasonable critical premises» – assumptions and 
exceptions, which tend to diminish or weaken the 
claims of the authority (especially exceptions) 
compared to other possible ones that gain strength 
with the presentation of evidence – which must 
be satisfied by a (presumed) authority so that 
their claims can be accepted as true in a valid 
argumentative way, based on premises of a rationally-
motivating force. 
In other words, to the reasons we have for believing 
a statement to be true (P, in this case), we must add the 
(critical) reasons we have for believing in the authority 
of the one who holds that statement as true. Therefore, 
when used correctly and prudently, the justification 
for the behaviour outlined in this argumentative 
scheme (Walton, 1999, p. 58) is ultimately based 
on the scientific evidence provided by a given field 
of knowledge and on the competencies of a person 
who is proficient in its techniques and who may 
nevertheless be questioned as an authority if these 
critical conditions are not met. 
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Ordinary (rational) premises
A is an authority
A is recognised as an authority A is personally reliable as a source
What A states implies P Reasonable critical premises
A is an authority in the field to which P belongs P is consistent with what other authorities state
A’s claims are based on evidence
A claims P
P is true
If A claims P and A says P is true, then P is true.
Assumptions Exceptions
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